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Traditional electric utility companies face a trade-oﬀ between building generation
facilities that utilize renewable energy (RE) and non-renewable energy (non-RE). The
ﬁrm’s input decision to build capacity for either source depends on several constraining
factors, including input prices, policies that promote or discourage RE use, and the
type of regulation faced by the ﬁrm. This paper models the utility company’s decision
between RE and non-RE capital types. From the model, two main results are derived.
First, rate-of-return (ROR) regulation decreases the investment in RE capital relative
to the unregulated ﬁrm. These ﬁndings suggest restructuring electricity generation
markets, which removes the ROR on generating assets, can increase the relative use of
RE. Second, the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) increases the investment in capital
and labor that requires RE as a source of electricity, as expected. The model shows
that the impact of an RPS depends on the amount of ROR regulation.
JEL classiﬁcation: L2, L51, L94, Q2, Q3.
Keywords: renewable portfolio standard, renewable energy, rate-of-return regulation.
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Rate-of-return (ROR) regulation is well-known in the electricity industry, and in regu-
lation literature, several articles have demonstrated that ROR regulation aﬀects the ﬁrm’s
input decision between capital and labor (Averch and Johnson, 1962; Petersen, 1975; Sher-
man, 1992; Spann, 1974). Typically, an electric utility is given the right as the sole generator,
and distributor of electricity in a region. In exchange, the utility is regulated by a public
commission that determines the rate for selling electricity. The rate includes a fair return
on capital investments.
However, diﬀerent types of capital can generate electricity. For example, renewable
energy (RE) and non-renewable energy (non-RE) diﬀer in their generation turbines, environ-
mental abatement technologies, and the requirements for land development and heat-waste
water. Moreover, RE sources are typically more costly to build, provide intermittent output,
and have an uncertain capacity to generate revenue.1 The inexperience with RE technologies
makes them a riskier investment. Thus, the cost of capital is higher for RE sources.
ROR regulation also aﬀects the decision to invest in diﬀerent types of capital. Speciﬁ-
cally, ROR regulation acts as a subsidy for capital, lowering the price of capital compared to
labor and lowering the relative price of cheaper capital. Since RE is typically more expensive
and riskier, the ROR increases the relative price of RE, and the ﬁrm utilizes less RE capital
than an unregulated ﬁrm.
This paper examines how ROR regulation aﬀects the utility company’s decision to
generate electricity from RE sources and non-RE sources. Following Averch and Johnson
(1962), I extend the ROR model to account for two diﬀerent types of output: electricity
1The EIA estimates biomass, hydro, geothermal, solar, and wind to have a greater total levelized cost
than conventional coal, advanced coal, and natural gas ﬁred plants (EIA, 2010).
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decreases the ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in relatively expensive capital for RE sources of
electricity. ROR regulation causes the ﬁrm to over-invest in capital, and over-invest in
capital that utilizes non-RE sources.
One policy consideration is the restructuring of the electricity markets from a monopoly
to allowing retail competition in the generation sector. Restructuring, ideally, removes the
allowable return on capital assets used for generation. Several papers have suggested mixed
results for the impact of restructuring on RE technologies. Wiser, Porter, and Clemmer
(2000) argue that restructuring may help RE because of the new attention given to RE
policies. Madlener and Stagl (2005) suggest that such electricity market liberalization can
allow for the diﬀerentiation of products and increase the potential for ‘green’ markets. On the
other hand, Kumbaroglu, Madlener, and Demirel (2008) suggest that liberalization decreases
the incentive to invest in renewable technologies. Empirically, Carley (2009) ﬁnds that
deregulation decreases the share of renewable electricity generated but increases the total
amount renewable energy generation. This paper shows that restructuring that removes or
decreases the allowed ROR can also promote the relative use of RE.
The model allows us to examine the impact of a second regulatory constraint of a renew-
able portfolio standard (RPS). For several years, advocates for renewable energy (RE) have
sought to create a national RPS (Darmstadter, 2004). In the last decade alone, Congress
has rejected fourteen proposals that establish a national standard. In April 2009, the US
House of Representative’s subcommittee on Energy held hearings on a bill that implements
a national RPS. The policy requires that generation from renewable resources fulﬁll a certain
percentage of electricity sold. The current bill requires utility companies to generate 6% of
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ity at the state level with over half the U.S. population living in states with an RPS. By
2011 twenty-nine states had enacted legislation that mandated utility companies to provide
consumers with electricity generated from RE.
Fischer (2006) models the impact of the RPS as a tax on non-RE sources and a subsidy
on RE sources; however, the RPS is actually a proportion constraint requiring the utility
to produce electricity using at least a minimum ratio of RE to non-RE sources. This paper
contributes to the RPS literature by presenting an alternative approach to modeling the
RPS that is more consistent with the incentives faced by the ﬁrm, and accounts for ROR
regulation. I examine the utility company’s input decision with a proportional constraint on
RE and non-RE sources for electricity generation. By modeling the decision of the ﬁrm to
choose between two diﬀerent sources of electricity, I can examine the mix of inputs caused
by a change in the RPS policy. The results for the RPS are similar to that of a tax/subsidy
approach, but the model of the ﬁrm accounts for the impact of ROR regulation. The results
suggest that a RPS will have varying impacts that depend on ROR regulation. A national
RPS will then have diﬀering impacts on regulated and restructured states.
In regulated industries, policymakers are often cautious of ﬁrms attempting to imple-
ment new and expensive technologies, and have consumers bear the burden of the cost with
uncertain improvements in output. For example, the cost of smart grid technologies in the
electricity industry are often thought to be diﬃcult to recover because their beneﬁts to
consumers are often unknown or unmeasurable. Additionally, solar technologies are often
thought to be too expensive for consumers. The results of this study suggest that ROR
2According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2009 10% of the nation’s electricity
generated came from RE, including hydro.
3
Working Paper 
DO NOT CITEregulation creates additional barriers to new technology adoption by incentivizing the ﬁrm
to over-invest in cheaper, less risky technologies.
The paper proceeds with a discussion of the electricity industry in section 2. A theoret-
ical model of ﬁrm behavior under the constraint of ROR regulation with two capital types is
presented in section 3. Section 4 extends the model to include the RPS. Section 5 concludes
with a discussion of policy implications.
2. Electricity Generation, Regulation, and Restructuring
The supply of electricity starts at a generating power plant. Generated electricity comes
from coal, natural gas, water, wind, solar, and other energy sources, but the source of gen-
eration becomes indistinguishable once the electricity is placed on the transmission grid. A
network grid of transmission substations, transmission lines, power substations, and trans-
formers distributes power to consumers for ﬁnal use (Warwick, 2002). Although electricity
demand varies throughout the day or season, a minimum level is supplied through what is
termed baseload generation, typically supplied by coal or nuclear power plants because of
their ability to produce a constant level of energy. Variable sources, such as wind, geother-
mal and solar energy, supply power when the fuel sources provide enough energy to generate
electricity. Natural gas, a more consistent source, typically ﬁlls peak-load demand, because
starting up such a generator has a low ﬁxed cost compared to coal or nuclear generators.
The supply of electricity from power plant to consumer is more complicated than a
simple competitive ﬁrm model. Utility companies take part in generating, transmitting,
or distributing electricity for sale to the consumers. Due to presumed economies of scale
and scope or cost subadditivity, utility companies within a state or region are often granted
monopoly power but are regulated by their prices and service conditions (Christensen and
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generating utilities, but a monopolist remains in the transmitting and distributing sector
(Saplacan, 2008).
Due to the ability to generate electricity from diﬀerent sources, the vertically integrated
electric utility is faced with a decision to invest in diﬀerent capital types. For example,
coal-ﬁred generation plants are reliable and well-known. On the other hand, wind turbines
are more capital intensive per MW, require more land and labor, and provide intermittent
output. As a consequence, wind energy, as well as most RE sources, provide uncertain
revenue for developers, making it a riskier investment and diﬃcult to acquire ﬁnancing for
new wind projects. Thus, RE sources typically have a higher cost of capital than non-RE
sources.
In the next section, we examine how the ROR aﬀects the ﬁrm’s input decisions between
these two capital types.
3. The utility company’s decision under Rate-of-Return regulation
Consider the vertically integrated utility that is granted monopoly power. The utility’s
decision is to determine which sources of energy to use given historical trends in electricity
demand and knowledge of electricity generation in that region. If the utility is a proﬁt
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maxkr;kn;lr;ln = p  z   rr  kr   rn  kn   w  (lr + ln) (1)
subject to
p  z   w  (lr + ln)
kn + kr
 sk (2)
wherez  zr + zn (3)
zr = zr (kr;lr) (4)
zn = zn (kn;ln) (5)
where a utility’s total output, z, comes from electricity generated by RE sources, zr, or by
non-RE sources, zn. To produce electricity, the utility chooses a mix of the four inputs:
labor and capital for RE sources, lr and kr, and labor and capital for non-RE sources, ln
and kn. Each energy source requires some labor but also resource speciﬁc capital. For
example, electricity generated from wind sources require wind turbines, but the capital
for wind cannot be used to generate electricity from fossil fuels. Production of electricity
requires both labor and capital, such that zr(kr;0) = zr(0;l) = 0 and zn(kn;0) = zn(0;l) = 0.
The marginal products are positive, implying that an increase in an input increases output,
@z
@kn > 0; @z
@kr > 0; @z
@ln > 0; @z
@lr > 0. Let rr, rn, and w represent the factor prices for RE
capital, non-RE capital, and either type of labor. Finally, assume the utility is a monopoly
that faces an inverse demand given by p = p(z), where p is the price of electricity and z the
amount of electricity generated (Averch and Johnson, 1962).
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over the rate base.3 Equation (2) shows the ROR regulatory constraint, sk, as a limit on
the maximum allowed percentage return, set by the government’s utility commission. If
the ROR constraint is binding then, we expect a tighter constraint to decrease proﬁt, and
@
@sk > 0 implies k > 0. If the regulatory maximum is set too low, then the ﬁrm would be
better oﬀ shutting down.4 I examine the case where the constraint is set higher than the
cost of at least one capital factor, sk > ri, and the ﬁrm is not at a corner solution, i.e.,
kn > 0;kr > 0; and lr > 0;ln > 0.









































The results from equations (6) through (9) are similar to the Averch-Johnson model. Equa-
tion (6) discloses that the marginal cost of capital for RE sources, rr, is greater than the







@kr is marginal revenue times the
marginal product of kr. Equation (7) shows a similar result for non-RE sources, and equation
(8) and (9) shows that the result for marginal product of either labor type equals the wage
3The return is calculated as a percentage of the rate base, c1kn+c2kr U1 U2, where the acquisition cost
of capital is ci and cumulative depreciation is Ui. Similar to Averch and Johnson (1962) for simpliﬁcation,
I assume that depreciation is zero and that capital acquisition costs equal one so that the rate base equals
the physical quantity of capital.




Due to the added term, ksk, in equations (6) and (7), we begin to demonstrate the
distortion caused by the ROR and it’s impact on the marginal rate of substitution (MRS)






, in (6) and substituting it into (7), we can determine the MRS between the two
capital types. Similar methods can be used to determine the MRS between capital and labor.








































Examining equation (10) discloses that the MRSkr;kn is greater than the case of the
unregulated monopoly because of the additional ksk term from ROR. The regulated ﬁrm
must substitute toward the relatively cheaper type of capital in order to maximize proﬁts.5
If RE capital is more expensive than non-RE capital, rr > rn, then the unregulated ﬁrm’s
5As shown by Averch and Johnson (1962), if sk increases, the ﬁrm shifts from using labor to using more
capital. This result holds for electricity produced from both RE and non-RE fuel sources, as shown by the
MRS in equations (14) and (15), and for cross-source substitution in equations (12) and (13).
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rn > 1. Adding an ROR regulatory constraint decreases the top and bottom by the
same amount, skk. The regulated ﬁrm’s MRS must be greater than the unregulated ﬁrm.
For equation (10) to hold, the regulated ﬁrm must substitute away from kr toward more kn,
increasing the equilibrium value of MRS.
Interestingly, as the regulatory allowed rate increases, i.e. sk increases, then the con-
straint becomes less binding, and RE capital becomes more expensive relative to non-RE
capital. Thus, even an increase in the allowed ROR decreases the incentive to invest in the
riskier, more expensive RE capital.
The result implies that relative prices matter. By including the same allowed ROR for
diﬀerent types of capital, regulators act as if they implement the same subsidy level on both
capital types. If non-RE is cheaper, then ﬁrms have an increased incentive to invest in non-
RE capital relative to having no ROR regulation. Furthermore, if restructuring decreases or
removes ROR regulation, then the investment in RE capital relative to non-RE capital will
increase, ceteris paribus.
However, other policies that are meant to encourage the use of RE sources may impact
the ﬁrm’s input decision. In the next section, we examined the case of the renewable portfolio
standard by adding that constraint to the ROR regulated ﬁrm.
4. The utility company’s decision under an RPS and ROR regulation
The renewable portfolio standard (RPS) is a proportional constraint on the generation
of electricity. The utility is required to generated X% of electricity from renewable sources,
which impacts the utility’s decision to generate electricity from both capital types. The
9
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maxkr;kn;lr;ln = p  z   rr  kr   rn  kn   w  (lr + ln) (1)
subject to
p  z   w  (lr + ln)
kn + kr
 sk (2.a)
sgzn  zr (2.b)
wherez  zr + zn (3)
zr = zr (kr;lr) (4)
zn = zn (kn;ln): (5)
The RPS constrains the decision of the ﬁrm by requiring that the ratio of RE to non-RE
generation be equal to or greater than a speciﬁed amount, sg, as shown by equation (2.b).
The two policy constraints in equations (2.a) and (2.b) are assumed to hold with equality.





















































where g is the change in proﬁts from implementing the RPS. Equations (6’) through (9’)
show that at the optimal choice of inputs, the price of an input equals the marginal revenue
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As before, the marginal revenue in equation (6’) is substituted into equation (7’) to
determine the MRS between the two types of capital. Similar methods are used to determine











































































By implementing a binding RPS, the MRSkr;kn gains the terms g and sg, implying
a decrease in the MRSkr;kn, as shown by equation (10’).6 The regulator increases the RPS
by increasing sg. As the constraint becomes more restrictive, the relative price of non-RE
capital increases, and the utility shifts away from using non-RE capital, kn, toward more
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MRSkr;kn decreases (Fischer, 2006). Thus, the higher the RPS, the greater the relative use
of RE sources to non-RE sources.7
The model can be adjusted to examine regions that have restructured their electric-
ity market from a monopolist to a more competitive market structure among generators.
Restructuring allows the incumbent utility to retain operation of transmission and distribu-
tion facilities, but generating ﬁrms can sell electricity wholesale to the distributing utility
through a power exchange that simulates a competitive market.8 Consumers have a choice of
determining their electricity generator, but distribution continues from the incumbent utility
(Warwick, 2002).9 This model can be applied to the distributing utility, still a monopolist,
who must purchase inputs at a speciﬁed ratio, i.e. wholesale electricity from generating
companies that produce electricity from RE sources and non-RE sources.
To illustrate the impact of the RPS on the restructured utility’s decision consider ﬁgure
1. On the vertical and horizontal axes are generation from non-RE sources and RE sources.
Let z0 and z1 represent the isoquants of electricity production, and consider the ﬁrm’s cost
minimization problem. To generate a level of electricity of z1 with no RPS, the ﬁrm chooses
an optimal level of inputs based on (z
nA;z
rA) at point A. A binding RPS increases the ratio
7The RPS constraint has a similar aﬀect on the MRS between RE and non-RE labor. With a higher
RPS the utility shifts away from using labor for non-RE toward more RE sources as shown by equation (11).
Equations (12) and (13) show the cross-source substitution between capital and labor. For these MRSs, the
sgg is added to the non-RE input and g is subtracted to the RE input. The ﬁrm always substitutes away
from the non-RE input toward the RE input. Equation (14) presents the MRS between labor and capital
for RE sources, and equation (15) presents the same MRS for non-RE sources. For both MRSs, an increase
in sg has an indeterminable aﬀect on the MRS. The MRS between labor and capital depends on the factor
prices and the marginal product of both inputs.
8A power exchange determines which plants operate by conducting bid-oﬀer auctions, and allows all
participants to observe the market price.
9Typically, the residential and commercial sector of consumers choose to remain with the incumbent utility
for their generation, and the incumbent utility must follow the RPS guidelines when selling electricity.
12
Working Paper 
DO NOT CITEof RE to non-RE fuels sources, zr
zn, to a level along the RPS line between the points B and
C. To remain at the same output level, z1, the ﬁrm must increase total cost. Alternatively,
the ﬁrm could decrease output to as low as z0 to maintain the same total cost.
For the distributing utility operating as a monopolist in a restructured state, the results
for the RPS constraint are still to increase the ratio of RE to non-RE generation. However,
the distributing utility does not own generating capital assets, and thus are not ROR regu-
lated on generating capital investments. The capital rate base is smaller and the ﬁrm’s input
decision is less distorted by ROR.
For the vertically integrated and regulated ﬁrm, equation (10’) shows that ROR regu-
lation can impact the decision to invest in RE capital or non-RE capital. Thus, the impact
of an RPS depends largely on the restructuring status of a state.
5. Results and Discussion
ROR regulation increases the incentive of the ﬁrm to overinvest in capital relative to
labor. However, in the electricity industry, diﬀerent types of capital are used to generated
electricity, some less risky and cheaper than others. We have modeled the trade-oﬀ between
two capital types from renewable and non-renewable energy sources. The results show that
ROR distorts the investment decision of the ﬁrm in RE capital.
The model can also account for the impact of an RPS, which has had varying impacts on
the market for electricity (Bernow, Dougherty, and Duckworth, 1997; Carley, 2009; Fischer,
2006; Palmer and Burtraw, 2005). This paper contributes to research on RPSs by presenting
an alternative method for analyzing the RPS as a proportional constraint faced by the ﬁrm
to generate electricity from renewable and non-renewable sources. I examine the impact of




Three main implications are considered. First, ROR regulation distorts the ﬁrm’s input
decision and creates an incentive to invest more in capital relative to an unregulated market.
Speciﬁcally, the regulated ﬁrm invests relatively more in cheaper, nonrenewable capital and
less in expensive, renewable capital than the unregulated ﬁrm. The risky and uncertain
nature of RE technologies creates several barriers to its development. Regulators are often
cautious to approve technology updates that have uncertain output or quality at a high cost
to consumers, and ﬁrms are less likely to adopt the new expensive technologies because the
ROR increases their relative cost.
Second, restructuring electricity markets removes the ROR on capital assets used for
the generation of electricity. Typically, the distributing utility is not allowed to own capital
for the purposes of generation, and instead must purchase generation from a competitive
wholesale electricity market. With no ROR regulation on generating capital, the restructured
market produces more electricity from RE sources and less non-RE generation, compared to a
vertically integrated market structure with ROR on all capital, ceteris paribus. Restructuring
that removes the allowed ROR on capital assets can also promote growth in RE capital
investments.
Finally, the RPS constraint aﬀects the decision of the ﬁrm by requiring generation at a
proportional amount of RE and non-RE generation. If the RPS is binding, ceteris paribus,
the policy decreases the ﬁrm’s MRS between renewable and nonrenewable sources, increasing
the relative use of RE technologies. However, the impact of the RPS depends largely on the
ROR constraint. For the regulated ﬁrm, the ROR has an opposite eﬀect on the use of RE
capital assets, by causing over-investment in non-RE capital. Thus, the same RPS will cause
14
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Policymakers should be cautious when implementing a national RPS. Such a federal
standard will reach across various market structures and regulation types. A national RPS
will create more market distortions for generation across regulated and restructured states.
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If sk < rn and rr, then the actual cost of capital is greater than allowable rate-of-return.
If this holds then the ﬁrm will shut down. To see this examine proﬁt
 = p  z   rnkn   rrkr   (ln + lr)  w
= p  z   skkn + (sk   rn)kn   skkr + (sk   rr)kr   (ln + lr)  w (1)
Given the rate-of-return constraint (2.b) and if sk < rn and rr, equation (1) must be
less than zero.
p  z   skkn + (sk   rr)kn   skkr + (sk   rn)kr   (ln + lr)  w  0
If sk < rn and rr, then the ﬁrm would maximize proﬁt where kn = 0 and kr = 0. This level
of input produces no electricity, so the ﬁrm shuts down.
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